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

Weaponized Tactics in Boko Haram Guerrilla Warfare and the Fear of Mines among Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria

التكتيكات المستخدمة كأسلحة في حروب بوكو حرام والخوف من الألغام بين النازحين داخليًا في شمال نيجيريا

Isiaka Olusesan SHITTU[1*]
[1] Department of Sociology, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria.
[*] Corresponding Author: Isiaka SHITTU (riaacos1@gmail.com)

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Abstract:

Objectives: This study focused on what can be done to achieve peace to enable the IDPs return to their community of origin to continue with their farming activities to produce food among other benefits to the Nigerian nation.

Methods: The study employed mixed methods of data collection by administering questionnaire on one hundred and seventy (170) randomly selected IDPs at Bayari YBC camp in Damaturu, Yobe State and validated the results by further conducting key informant interview with ten (10) purposively selected key informants. The methods adopted in data analysis include Chi-square and binary logistic regression because of their strength in testing and predicting the relationship between the two variables in the study.

Results: The findings revealed a positive relationship which implies that there is a link between Boko Haram weaponized tactics of using IEDs and mines and the fear by IDPs to return home. Structural Violence theory was adopted to provide theoretical explanations to the major concepts and the study's findings resolved the long- existing research gap and concern in security studies on why IDPs are not exiting camps and returning home.

Conclusions: The study concluded that the presence of IEDs and mines at home is the major reason the IDPs are not returning. Therefore, on policy implications, the study recommended that governments and other stakeholders should prioritize deradicalization of the terrorists, facilitate full restoration of peace and also guarantee the safety of returnee IDPs in Northern Nigeria.

Keywords: *Weaponized tactics; improvised explosive devices (IEDs); mines; terrorism; Radicalization; deradicalization; reintegration.*

الملخص:

الأهداف: ركزت هذه الدراسة على ما يمكن القيام به لتحقيق السلام لتمكين النازحين من العودة إلى مجتمعاتهم الأصلية لمواصلة أنشطتهم الزراعية لإنتاج الغذاء، من بين فوائد أخرى للأمة النيجيرية.

المنهجية: استخدمت الدراسة أساليب مختلطة لجمع البيانات من خلال توزيع استبيان على مائة وسبعين (170) نازحًا تم اختيارهم عشوائياً في مخيم "باياري واي بي سي" (Bayari YBC) في داماتورو بولاية يوبي، وتحققت من النتائج من خلال إجراء مقابلة مع عشرة (10) مخبرين رئيسيين تم اختيارهم عمداً. وتضمنت أساليب تحليل البيانات المعتمدة في هذه الدراسة اختبار "كا-تربيع" (Chi-square) والانحدار اللوجستي الثنائي لقوتهما في اختبار والتنبؤ بالعلاقة بين المتغيرين في الدراسة.

النتائج: كشفت النتائج عن وجود علاقة إيجابية تشير إلى وجود صلة بين تكتيكات بوكو حرام القتالية في استخدام العبوات الناسفة والألغام وبين خوف النازحين من العودة إلى ديارهم. تم تبني نظرية العنف الهيكلي لتقديم تفسيرات نظرية للمفاهيم الرئيسية، وسدت نتائج الدراسة الفجوة البحثية والاهتمام القائم منذ فترة طويلة في الدراسات الأمنية حول سبب عدم مغادرة النازحين للمخيمات والعودة إلى ديارهم.

الخلاصة: خلصت الدراسة إلى أن وجود العبوات الناسفة والألغام في الموطن هو السبب الرئيسي لعدم عودة النازحين. وبناءً على ذلك، وفيما يتعلق بالآثار المترتبة على السياسات، أوصت الدراسة بضرورة أن تمنح الحكومات وأصحاب المصلحة الآخرون الأولوية لإزالة التطرف لدى الإرهابيين، وتسهيل الاستعادة الكاملة للسلام، وضمان سلامة النازحين العائدين في شمال نيجيريا.

الكلمات المفتاحية: *التكتيكات المسلحة؛ العبوات الناسفة المرتجلة؛ الألغام؛ الإرهاب؛ التطرف الفكري؛ مكافحة التطرف الفكري؛ إعادة الإدماج المجتمعي.*

Citation

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1 Introduction

The improvisation of weapons and mines by the insurgents in Northern Nigeria is one of the major concerns why the asymmetric conflict in the region has persisted for more than two decades (Mustapha, 2022). In 2009, an extremist Islamist group called Boko Haram began a violent campaign that has resulted in the deaths of 300,500 people, with the death toll rising on an almost daily basis and the displacement of over 4.4 million Nigerians (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC, 2024). The terrorist group has also carried out frequent attacks and bombings, in some cases using, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines. The target locations have included police stations, military facilities, churches, schools, beer halls, news study offices, and the United Nations building in Abuja (Uzodike, 2022). Therefore, there is an urgent need to proffer solution to the security challenges posed by the terrorists because the people being displaced from the affected region are majorly farmers and the region serves as the food basket to Nigeria and other Sub-Sahara African nations (William,2019).The current violent activities have been aided by the terrorist weaponized tactics in producing IEDs and mines among other weapons (Uzodike, 2022). In order to encourage the IDPs to return to their community of origin, urgent de-escalation of the conflict through deradicalization is important. Deradicalization is a process of changing an individual or a group with an extremist view to a normal and moderate position .It is a process in-between disarmament and reintegration of a violent extreme group or individual (Forest, 2022).The concept involves changing beliefs and behaviours through interventions like moral, religious and psychological counselling, education and successful reintegration back into the society.

Weaponized tactics, as used in this paper, refers to the invention and adaptation of non-military tools improvised to inflict harms and caused damage to some people or community in a war-like manner. It is the technological adaptation and improvisation of some tools as bombs to aid terrorism. Those weaponized tactics are limited to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines in this paper. IED refers to an Improvised Explosive Device which can be homemade bomb or destructive device used be insurgents or terrorists to harass, incapacitate or cause high casualties frequently in asymmetric warfare (Aguwa, 2023).While IEDs are designed to be concealed on roadsides, in vehicles or carried, often using non-military components, common types as being experienced by victims in Northern Nigeria include roadside bombs, vehicle bomb IEDs (VBIEDs), suicide vests and victim-operated devices like pressure-plates. The word mines in this paper simply refers to explosives placed in the ground or sea which are meant to explode upon contact. IEDs and mines which are two major explosives being used by the terrorists in the Northern Nigeria, With these weaponized tactics, the terrorists increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks have targeted Nigeria's ethno-religious fault lines and security agents (Mustapha, 2022). For instance, in January 2013, Boko Haram took control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala Balge, and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials, the entire population of the area, leading to wanton internal displacement with its attendant problems. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how weaponized tactics in the use of IEDs and mines by the terrorists has caused fear and IDPs unwillingness to voluntarily return home. It is also important to examine the IDPs existing knowledge about IEDs and mines, evaluate the feelings and perception towards means by which deradicalization can enhance peace building in the Northern Nigeria and also proffer insight into the challenges confronting deradicalization.

Reviewing some of the existing literature on the background of the violence, Northern Nigeria is a region with a predominantly Muslim population and has a well-documented history of militant religiosity dating back to the highly successful holy war (jihad) fought by Sheik Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817) in the early 19th century (Hickey, 2024). Usman dan Fodio launched a jihad against what he saw as the hopelessly corrupt and apostate Hausa ruling elite of the time and established the sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate – one of the largest and most powerful empires in sub-Saharan Africa (Marchal, 2022: Agbiboa, 2023c). What began as a search for religious purification soon became a search for a political kingdom (Crowder, 2024; ICG, 2010).

Some prominent authors like Falola and Agbiboa have argued that the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, and its subsequent dealings with colonial and post-colonial states, opened it up to the corrupting influence of secular political power. Ever since, 'there has been resistance among the area's Muslims to Western education' (Marchal, 2022). Muhammed Marwa was another active figure to reckon with in the history of violent religiosity and northern radicalism. He was the leader of Maitatsine, an Islamic scholar who migrated from the town of Marwa in northern Cameroon to the city of Kano in 1945. In Kano, Marwa became an Islamic zealot preoccupied with the purification of Islam. He believed that Islam had come under the corrupting influence of modernization (Westernization) and the formation of the modern state (Agbiboa, 2023d). The then famous Islamic zealot attracted the urban poor in the northern city of Kano with his message

that 'denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western Influence, and refused to recognize secular authorities' (HRW, 2022). The urban Muslim poor were attracted to Marwa because 'he condemned the hypocrisy and ostentation of the nouveau riche and promised redemption and salvation to God's righteous people' (Hickey, 2024). Among the groups attracted by Marwa were the 'Almajiris' - that is, a group of young itinerant students of the Qur'an who had a very simple lifestyle and earned their daily bread begging on the city.The Almajiris group today has become the main source of human recruitment as figthers and suicide bombers for the Boko Haram sect.

To restore peace in Northern Nigeria and encourage the IDPs to return home, effective deradicalization mechanism must be put in place. This can be achieved through the following measures: First, free education must be a priority of governments at all levels. The almanjiris schools built throughout the six (6) states in the Northwestern Nigeria during the tenure of former President Goodluck Jonathan must be sustained. This programme of free education for the almanjiris must be sustained by the current governments and the beneficiaries must also have access to free school feeding. This is important because the almanjiris have been identified as providing the human resources and increasing the numerical strength of the terrorists.

Another toolkit in deradicalizing Boko Haram insurgents is the creation of gainful employment for the northern teaming youths. The unemployed youths have been indoctrinated with violent religious teaching in the past to take up arms against the state. Some were made to carry IEDs as suicide bombers especially young girls and ladies. The provision of gainful employment is a veriTable mean of deradicalizing insurgents in the Northern Nigeria. Similar to this is the provision of basic social amenities, government creation of available and adequate housing scheme, free healthcare services and other forms of social investments. In the same vein, the re-introduction of amnesty program through which significant achievement of relative peace in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria was attained can also be adopted. However, failure of the Northern terrorists to embrace the programme earlier in Nigeria does not signal entire failure. It can be repackage and re-invested.

Similarly as a deradicalization mechanism, it is essential to incentivize voluntarily surrendered insurgents and re-integrate them into the civilian life. The process of doing this is called Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR).

The general aim of DDR programs is the voluntary disarmament and discharge of combatants from armed groups, and to facilitate them in starting a new life, making a living for themselves, and finding a place in society. DDR also refers to the process of demilitarizing armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession and the use of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups, and by assisting former insurgents to reintegrate into civilian life. DDR can be viewed as a five-stage process including weapon surrender, assembly, discharge, short-to medium-term reinsertion, and longer-term reintegration. It is important to recognize that these stages may not occur in linear fashion, depending on the requirements of each peace process. The first stage is the stage of weapon surrendering, followed by amnesty and discharge and then short to medium term reinsertion scheme. The final stage in DDR is long term reintegration opportunity. Deradicalization is an integral component of DDR and must be vigorously pursued to curb the terrorist weaponized tactics and encourage large scale IDPs return in Northern Nigeria.

Explaining the study's concepts from structural violence theoretical perspective, the theory which was developed by the Norwegian Sociologist, Johan Galtung in his 1969 article "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", has its basic tenet reflecting the fact that violence can occur not just through direct physical acts but also through societal structures that systematically disadvantage certain groups, preventing them from meeting their basic needs and deny them equal opportunities. The theory emphasizes that violence is unavoidable when social structures prevent people from reaching their full potential due to systemic inequalities. Examples of causes of structural violence include lack of access to clean water and sanitation in impoverished communities, inadequate healthcare systems for marginalized populations, gender-based discrimination limiting women's access to leadership position and economic participation, systemic racism leading to unequal opportunities for education and employment.

Operationalizing this theory, the theory adequately explains the rationale behind the structural violence in the Northern Nigeria leading to the displacement of 4.4 million people so far. The theory adequately explains Boko Haram violences leading to the displacement of people in the Northern Nigeria as being the outcome of societal structures that systematically disadvantage some members of the society who later took to violence and became terrorists.

2 Methods

This section provides details of study location, population, sample size, methods of data collection and the statistical test and analysis .The study was carried out at Damaturu IDPs camp in Yobe Sate Nigeria with one thousand and seven hundred (1700) IDPs according to camp register, (2024). Prior to the field work, ethical approval was sought from Adekunle Ajasin University Reseach Ethic Committee and was granted after a thorough review of the research consent form. This was necessary because the study was dealing with a vulnerable human population.

For sampling selection, purposive sampling was employed based on the justifications of its efficiency and effectiveness in selecting participants. Simple random sampling based on the justification for its convenience was also adopted to identify the respondents for key informant interview. There are thirty-four (34) tents across the camp. Five (5) respondents were selected from each tent purposively as not all IDPs in the camps were displaced from their community of origin by Boko Haram. Snowballing sampling method based on the justification of its referral strength was earlier adopted to recruit only conflict-induced IDPs for the study.

Therefore, the study covered one hundred and seventy (170) IDPs who were selected, and questionnaire were administered on them while a total of ten (10) participants in accordance with some inclusion criteria were further selected as key informants. Therefore, the total number of respondents for this study is one hundred and eighty (180).This sample which represents over 10 % of total population is believed to meet the requirement for adequacy and representativeness which are qualities of a good sample from a defined population.

On method of data collection, mixed method was adopted. These included both quantitative method and qualitative method. The quantitative method was through the use of questionnaire which can be justified on the ground that survey through questionnaire has the advantages of time efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The questionnaire contained both open and close-ended questions. The second method, which is qualitative, was through the use of key informant. The adoption of key informant interview can be justified because of its merit in providing in-depth details about the subject of study.

For data analysis, the use of Chi-square and binary logistic regression was adopted while the data from key informant interviews was analyzed through content analysis. These methods selection can be justified based on their advantages of effective and detailed analysis.

The general logistic regression model used for this study is according to Newman (2001):

$$P(Y = 1/\beta) = \frac{e^{\beta_0+\beta_1X_1+.....+\beta_nX_n}}{1+e^{\beta_0+\beta_1X_1+.....+\beta_nX_n}}$$

Which computes the probability that the response variable Y is equal to 1 subject to the covariate vector: X = ($x_i \ldots x_n$) and parameter vector and parameter vector β = ($\beta_{i.....}\beta_n$). Logistic regression does not predict the value of the dependent variable; it rather gives the expected probability that the dependent variable is unity subject to the settings of the covariates and their estimated parameters.

The logistic regression model is also expressed in linear approximation as:

$$Log[p/1\text{-}p] = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \ldots + b_nX_n + e$$

The regression models were developed to predict the likelihood of IDPs' desire to return back in their communities. The main assumption of Binary Logistic Regression Model is obeyed by the nature of the dependent variable. That is, the desire to return is a categorical variable with dichotomous responses coded as "have desire=1" and "have no desire=0". All analyses were conducted using the statistical software called STATA Version 15 for its benefits of ease in analyzing, managing and examining data patterns. STATA is also a reliable software in analyzing small data as it is the case in this study.

3 Findings

This section details the major findings and outcomes of the study using Tables to show frequency and percentage distribution as well as pictural display of responses through pie chat and bar chat.

The focus in this sub-section is to illustrate and present the socio-demographic attributes of the respondents, such as age, sex, marital status, religion and ethnicity in tabular format to show the frequency and percentage distribution.

Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Socio-demographic Characteristics	Frequency n=170	Percentage %
Age		
52–64	94	55.3
65–74	76	44.7
Sex		
Male	116	68.2
Female	52	31.8
Marital status		
Currently in union	102	65.4
Separated/divorced/widowed	52	34.6
Religion		
Muslim	102	64.6
Christians/others	56	34.4
Ethnicity		
Fulani	68	40.5
Hausa	96	57.1
Kanuri	4	2.4

Source: Field survey 2025.



The major findings from the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents reveal the age distribution of two primary groups: those aged 52–64 years (55.3%) and those aged 65–74 years (44.7%). This distribution highlights a predominantly middle-aged to elderly demographic among respondents.

This sub-section illustrates and presents virtually perceptions and levels of awareness of existing weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines in the Northern Nigeria using Table and pie chart.

Table 2: Evaluation of IDPs existing Knowledge about IEDs and Mines in the Northern

Feelings and perceptions	Frequency	Percentage
Do you have any knowledge about weaponized tacticsin Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines?		
Yes	156	92.9
No	12	7.1
Do you know of any existing weaponized tacticsIEDs and mines in your community of origin?		
Yes	84	53.9
No	72	46.1

Source: Field survey 2025.

The Table above virtually illustrate knowledge about the existing weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines in the Northern Nigeria, the knowledge and awareness of the respondents was first documented. A substantial majority of IDPs (92.9%) have knowledge about the Boko Haram weaponized tactics which has led to their fear in returning to their community of origin.They expressed their belief that their community is saturated with planting of IEDs and mines on the ground. However, awareness among some respondents was low, with only 53.9% indicating awareness, while 46.1% are not aware. This gap highlights the urgent need for better communication and outreach regarding the danger of IEDs and mines.

This result is very significant because it proffers insight on urgent need for the de-escalation of the conflict through deradicalization.

The Table underneath virtually illustrate respondents' perception towards means by which weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines and how the innovation can be curbed to restore peace in the Northern Nigeria.

Table 3: Respondents' Feelings towards the danger posed by weaponized tactics.

What would you like to have in your place of origin to aid peace building program?		
security in place	166	98.8
access to business opportunities	82	48.8
access to health	142	84.5
Deradicalization programs	110	65.2
social support	142	84.5
land for farming	100	59.5
access to water facility	142	84.5
children school facilities	82	48.8
good road network	106	63.1
housing/shelter facilities	108	64.3
market facilities	92	54.8
others	100	59.5

Source: Field survey 2024.



According to the responses analyzed, the top priority to achieve peace is security, desired by 98.8% of respondents. Other critical needs include access to business opportunities (48.8%), healthcare (84.5%), social support (84.5%), land for farming (59.5%), water facilities (84.5%), children's school facilities (48.8%), good road networks (63.1%), housing/shelter facilities (64.3%), and market facilities (54.8%).

Table 4: Chi-square test of relationship between Fear of weaponized Tactics and IDPs desire to return.

Perception about existing weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines program	Desire to Return			χ^2	p-value
	Desired	Not desired	Total		
Perception about existing weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines mechanism					
Perfect	40(65.2)	3(23.1)	52		
Fair	80(63.0)	9(31.0)	116		
Poor	88(62.9)	13(30.1)	140	0.682	P>0.05

Source: Field survey 2025.

Table 5: Binary Logistic Regression Test.

Desire to return	Odd ratio	P-value	95% confidence interval
Length of stay in camp			
5 years or less	(Referent)		
More than 5 years	0.6821	0.057	0.0681 – 1.0423
Reason still in camp: Government directive?			
Yes	(Referent)		
No	2.6748	0.080	0.8879 – 8.0581
Reason still in camp: Children in school in camp?			
Yes	(Referent)		
No	0.3778	0.107	0.1158 – 1.2327

Source: Field survey 2025.

This sub-section illustrates the test of influence of the weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines on the IDPs' desire to return.

The key findings from the response is that effective deradicalization program has influences on the IDPs desire to return home and continue with their farming activities since the region is primarily agrarian.

4 Discussion

This section discusses the significance of the results of the study and endeavours to compare them with previous work using relevant references. Discussing Table 3.1, the major findings from the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents reveal the age distribution of two primary groups: those aged 52–64 years (55.3%) and those aged 65–74 years (44.7%). This distribution highlights a predominantly middle-aged to elderly demographic among respondents. Gender distribution shows that males significantly outnumber females in leadership roles within the camps, with 68.2% of respondents being male and 31.8% female. Marital status data indicates that a majority of respondents are in stable unions, with 65.4% currently in union. In contrast, 34.6% of respondents are separated, divorced, or widowed, reflecting a notable proportion who have experienced marital disruption. Religious affiliation among respondents predominantly comprises Muslims (64.6%), with Christians and others making up 34.4%. This distribution reflects the dominant religious composition within the camps. The ethnic composition of respondents includes 40.5% Fulani, 57.1% Hausa, and 2.4% Kanuri. The Hausa ethnic group is the most represented, followed by Fulani and a smaller presence of Kanuri respondents.

Discussing Table 3.2 which examines levels of awareness of existing weaponized tactics in IEDs and mines in the Northern Nigeria using Table and pie chart. The knowledge and awareness of the respondents was first documented. A substantial majority of IDPs (92.9%) have knowledge about IEDs and mines. However, awareness about weaponized tactics danger in their communities of origin is lower, with only 53.9% indicating awareness, while 46.1% are not aware. This gap highlights the urgent need for better communication and outreach regarding the danger in weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines to guarantee safety of the residents. Comparing the result with the previous studies, this study results bears similarities to the successful awareness campaign about Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines in Iran, Uganda, Liberia and Bosnia which encouraged IDPs to return home even before the full cessation of conflict (Sliwa & Wiig, 2016).The voluntary return of IDPs is regarded as an essential step toward re-establishing normalcy, peace, and stability in regions afflicted by conflict (Rosenberg,2004;Salama.2001).As shown by similar study in Colombia, some IDPs have actively engaged in community development initiatives within conflict-affected areas. Replicating this model in Northern Nigeria could prove transformative and empowering for IDPs.

Similarly, discussing Table 3.3 which centers on the respondents' feeling and perception towards the means by which safety of returnee IDPs in the Northern Nigeria can be guarantee. According to the responses analyzed, the top priority among the means is security, desired by 98.8% of respondents. Other critical needs include access to business opportunities (48.8%), healthcare (84.5%), new weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines (65.2%), making coefficient r=0.65, social support (84.5%), land for farming (59.5%), water facilities (84.5%), children's school facilities (48.8%), good road networks (63.1%), housing/shelter facilities (64.3%), and market facilities (54.8%). Another discussion of results and findings as contained in Table 3.5 is the relationship between IDPs' perception towards the danger in IEDs and mines in their places of origin and their desire to return.

The Chi-square test value ($\chi 2 = 0.682$) and the associated p-value ($p > 0.05$) indicate that the observed relationship between the two variables could not be due to random chance. This statistical insignificance suggests that the perceived level of weaponized tactics(O.R = 0.682; P > 0.05) might be more influential in determining the desire of IDPs to return into their communities.The main interpretation of these results is that while deradicalization of Boko Haram insurgents is essential, it alone may not be sufficient to influence the decision to return. IDPs may consider a variety of factors, including security, economic opportunities, family ties, and the overall quality of life, which are not captured merely by perceptions. Therefore, although improving the existing deradicalization programs could be beneficial, it should be part of a broader strategy that addresses multiple facets of IDPs' lives to effectively encourage their return. Furthermore, the slight significant relationship also highlights the complexity of the weaponized .Policymakers and aid organizations should be cautious in assuming that enhancing deradicalization will directly lead to increased return rates. Instead, a more holistic approach that includes improving security, creating economic opportunities, and fostering social cohesion might be necessary to support IDPs in their decision to return. This analysis underscores the need for a comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing IDPs' desire to return and this result. Future study should aim to identify and address these multifaceted influences that better support IDPs in their journey toward voluntary return.

Comparing the significance of the results above with the previous similar studies in mitigating the pitfalls of unsuccessful eradication of weaponized tactics in Boko Haram guerrilla warfare in Northern Nigeria, the template of other successful countries who had previously experienced such challenges can be adopted. Countries like Iran and Colombia have adopted effective strategies against terrorism. Besides, these countries have also engaged key informants among the returnees to facilitate community mediation and also provide psychological support for those grappling with post-traumatic stress upon their return. This approach has yielded positive outcomes (Mohammadi et al., 2018). Beyond involving returnees, community leaders play a vital role in mediating between returning IDPs and local populations, fostering social cohesion through their leadership skills and personal networks, which also extend to social media. Moreover, study funded by the World Bank on internal migration has shown that sustainable peace is more likely when there is strong social cohesion between returnees and local populations, and the involvement of community leaders in facilitating this process is integral (Mohammadi et al., 2018).

From Table 3.5, the binary logistic regression analysis provides insights into the factors influencing the desire of IDPs to return to their communities. While none of the examined variables showed did not show statistically significant results at the 0.05 level, the trends indicated by the odds ratios and p-values suggest important considerations for policymakers and aid organizations. The length of stay in the camp, government directives, and children's schooling in the camp each have potential implications on the decision to return, albeit with varying degrees of influence. The results emphasize the need for multifaceted approaches that address not only deradicalization program as a solution but also personal and familial considerations. Future study should continue to explore these and other variables to develop a more comprehensive understanding of what drives the desire to return among IDPs. By addressing these factors holistically, strategies can be better tailored to support the successful IDPs return into their communities. On content analysis and interpretation of findings from key informants and in analyzing the qualitative data generated from the key informant interviews, concepts were coded and subsequently structured into groups for each transcription and thereafter combined. Themes were then developed by adding more concepts, combined or split. Responses that proved difficult to be directly grouped into the themes were regrouped after the discussions among the reviewers. The significance of responses by respondents and the relationship with the adopted themes were deliberated on. In other words, the steps taken to analyze qualitative data included the collection and organization of data, the development of a coding system, the identification of themes, the analysis of the data for insights and lastly the report of the insight from the analysis.

Below are the key responses from the selected key informants on some of the questions asked during the key informant interview. A response by a key informant to the question on the challenges facing the execution of deradicalization is:

'The major challenges are lack of funds for implementation arising from budgetary allocation, partisanship on the part of stakeholders, nonchalant attitude, high level of illiteracy in the North, continuous violence and attacks. Of all these, the major challenge in the Northern region is inclement security situation'.

Interpretation: The above response, when triangulated from the response to the same question from the questionnaire administered is the same. The interpretation of the above response is that inadequate funding as provided in the budget by the government for the implementation deradicalization program is the major

obstacles to smooth execution to take care of the need of the targeted population. This implies that with the adequate budgetary provision, large scale return is expected to take place in the Northern region. This analysis of the key informant response also aligns with the findings on the similar issue using the questionnaire to solicit response from the respondents.

Discussing some possible limitations to this study, first, this study could only be representative for the Northern Nigeria. The situation of internally displaced persons in other regions is likely to be slightly different and they might face other requirements than the ones indicated in this study. Another limitation is lack of financial and technical possibilities to make use of technical instruments like GPS systems for data collection and supervision. The other limitations include loss in translation as well as potential selection bias.

5 Conclusions

This study would like to conclude that the weaponized tactics by the Boko Haram insurgents in their guerrilla war in Northern Nigeria is a major factor in IDPs fear to return home. The IDPs will willingly return home, become engaged economically, socially and politically and be sustainably reintegrated if, for instance the government and other allied social agencies in Nigeria, collaborate with other concerned stakeholders. This position fully aligns with the theoretical and methodological strengths as well as variables strength of this study. This study is significant, and any future related studies might concentrate on this specific issue of how social institutions can collaborate with government agencies to evaluate and raise funds to finance deradicalization of the insurgents to minimize or eradicate their evil weaponized tactics in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and mines. The findings are also useful to future studies in the academic field of counter- insurgency. Most importantly, the study will serve as a guide to present and future generations in the field of security. This study will add to knowledge on weaponized tactics in Boko Haram warfare and how this negative innovation can be curbed to achieve enduring peace and guarantee safe return of IDPs in the Northern Nigeria.

5.1 Recommendations

In light of these findings, some actionable recommendations are proposed:

- The government should prioritize the restoration of social infrastructure after the restoration of peace particularly emphasizing the restoration of water and electricity, as these were significantly linked to successful reintegration.
- To address the reluctance among willingly surrendered sect members, the government should ensure the presence of peacekeeping forces before facilitating deradicalization. This is important because the return of a large number of IDPs to post-conflict areas can potentially pose a threat to peace if returnees struggle to establish sustainable livelihoods or if community infrastructure and services become insufficient or overburdened due to an influx of returnees.
- Commercial activities in the conflict-affected communities in the Northern region should be resuscitated. The re-opening of commercial activities will augment the region economics of buying and selling, marketing, business activities and aid in fast-tracking a return to pre-displacement life.
- The sect members who have already demonstrated willingness to surrender should be assisted in monetary term and technical education on positive innovation to enable them quickly reintegrate to the larger society.
- This study would similarly like to recommend economic opportunities for the surrendered sect members, especially in terms of job creation or encouragement to practice skills that were hitherto acquired during their deradicalization processes programs.

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